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WE ST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LEGISLATOR'S PRIVILEGE FRO M ARREST.
Summons was served on Senator Huey P. Long in an action for
libel. He moved to quash the summons and the service thereof,
claiming a violation of his constitutional privilege in that members
of Congress, "shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the session of their respective houses, and in going to and return-
ing from the same; and for any speech on debate in either house,
they shall not be questioned in any other place."' Held, service
of civil process is not an arrest under this provision. Long v. An-
sell.2
The present interpretation clearly reaches a proper result.
Our type of government does not favor privileged classes and pro-
vides this exception only to preserve the freedom of the national
legislature. Arrest as a means of starting a civil action is more
rare today than when this provision was framed.3  There is little
inconvenience to a Senator and no loss to his state4 when he is
served with a summons in a civil action while attending the Sen-
ate. The session will probably adjourn before the case is tried5
and, if not, he can usually secure a leave of absence to make his
defense or leave the case entirely in an attorney's hands. Many
times he will not even need to appear. If his public and private
duties conflict too greatly, that is a ground for continuance, al-
though it is a matter of the court's discretion rather than as a
right.' Thus, a contrary rule would do little more than serve as
an aid to defraud creditors.
It is interesting to notice that the last part of the privilege
I U. S. CONST., art. I, § 6.
2 55 S. Ct. 21 (1934); commented upon at an earlier stage in (1934) 34
CoL. L. REV. 1131. See generally BowERs, CIVIL PROCESS AND ITS SERVICE
(1927) 563-69; 3 RNDs, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(1907) 1110-16; Field, The Constitutional Privilege of Legislators (1925) 9
MINN. L. REV. 442-57.
3 Finley, Arrest of Defendant in Civil Action (1932) 20 Ky. L. J. 478-80.
4 To arrest a Senator is to deprive a state of half its voice in the Senate.
Yet Huey Long voluntarily absented himself from that body for two years.
And the people of West Virginia have just elected a Senator under the con-
stitutional age limit who will not take his seat during five months of the
present session.
5 This is even more likely to be true in state legislatures which usually meet
at longer intervals and for shorter sessions. Even Congress is only in session
about half the year.
a Nones v. Edsal], 18 Fed. Cas. 296 (1848); see Coxe v. M'Clenachan, 3
Dal]. 478, 479, 1 L. Ed. 687 (1798); Johnson v. Offutt, 14 Mete. (Ky.) 19,
21 (1862). But see Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin, 4 Dal]. 107, 1 L. Ed. 762 (1790).
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is always liberally construed7 whereas the first part is usually in-
terpreted so narrowly as nearly to abolish it. For example, in the
phrase "treason, felony, and breach of the peace" the expression
"breach of the peace" is deemed to exclude all crimes from the
privilege, although that interpretation clearly makes the words
treason and felony superfluous.8  The member is not protected
from a subpoena, although it is doubtful if he can be arrested and
forced to attend trial. The privilege is stated to extend "in going
to and returning from the same" but this means only a reasonable
time.10 The provision never operates against the legislature;1
and not against the courts unless it is properly and promptly
claimed, for this is a personal privilege and is considered waived
unless claimed. 12 It does not protect the member if he is the plain-
tiff." Indeed, it is restricted so narrowly that now, when civil pro-
cess may be served, the exemption confers little more than a priv-
ilege from actual arrest in a civil suit. It was not always so.
Several early cases refused to allow the service of civil process. 4
Some, however, involve only dicta on this point, and others are
based on a mistaken idea of Blackstone. 15 Thus, the better view
7 Cochran v. Couzens, 59 App. D. C. 374, 42 F. (2d) 783 (1930); Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880); Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass.
1, 3 Am. Dec. 189 (1808).
s Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 28 S. Ct. 163, 52 L. Ed. 278(1907); United States v. Wise, 28 Fed. Cas. 742 (1842);'State v. Smalls, 11
S. C. 262 (1878): see Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295, 25 S. Ct.
243 (1905); 1 STony, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (5th ed. 1891) § 865. Contra: State ex rel. Insenring v. Polacheck, 101
Wis. 427, 77 N. W. 708 (1898).
9 United States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 341, 1 L. Ed. 859 (1800); United States
v. Thomas, 28 Fed. Cas. 79 (1847); Respublica v. Duane, 4 Yeates 347 (Pa.
1807); In, re Potter, 55 Barb. 625 (N. Y. 1864) (New York legislature de-
cided an attachment was a breach of their privilege).
10 Hoppin v. Jenckes, 8 R. I. 453, 5 Am. Rep. 597 (1867); Corey v. Russell,
4 Wend. 204 (N. Y. 1830); Lewis v. E]mendorf, 2 Johns 222 (N. Y. 1801);
Colvin v. Morgan, 1 Johns 415 (N. Y. 1800).
"People ex rel. Hastings v. Hofstadter, 258 N. Y. 425, 180 N. E. 106(1932).l2 Geyer's Lessee v .Irwin, supra n. 6; Prentis v. The Commonwealth, 5
Rand. 697, 16 Am. Dec. 782 (Va. 1827); Johnson's Ex'rs v. Johnson, 4 Call.
38 (Va. 1785); Chase v. Fish, 16 Me. 132 (1839). Contra: Cook v. Senior,
3 ]Kan. App. 278, 45 Pac. 126 (1896).
13Botts v. Tabb, 10 Leigh 616 (Va. 1840).
14 Bolton v. Martin, 1 Dall. 296, 1 L. Ed. 144 (1788); Miner v. Markham,
28 Fed. 387 (E. D. Wis. 1886); Cook v. Senior, supra n. 12; Anderson v.
Rountree, 1 Pin. 115 (Wis. 1841); Doty v. Strong, 1 Pin. 84 (Wis. 1840);
Tillinghast v. Carr, 4 McCord 152 (S. C. 1827); King v. Coit, 4 Day 129(Conn. 1810); see Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin, supra n. 6; Nones v. Edsall,
supra n. 6.
15 In Merrick v. Gidding, MacArthur & M., 55 (D. C. 1879), it is pointed
out that Bolton v. Martin, supra n. 14, relied on a passage in an old edition
of Blackstone which had been changed 18 years before. Miner v. Markham,
smpra n. 14, also quotes this passage in its original form.
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seems to support the principal case.10
Some states, including West Virginia, have enlarged the priv-
ilege by statute. An early Virginia law privileged the members
"from all arrests, attachments, executions and all other process
whatsoever". By this law it was possible to issue civil process,
but it could not be served until the end of the privilege.17 West
Virginia, with a constitutional privilege similar to that in the fed-
eral constitution,5 has a statute which allows the service of civil
process but declares that, "no trial shall be had or judgment ren-
dered in any such suit, nor shall any execution or attachment be
levied upon the property of such member during the sessions of
the legislature or for ten days immediately before or immediately
after session.'"" If any such action is taken it will be held in-
valid and set aside.20 If we accept the interpretation of the princi-
pal case it would seem that the statute is broader than the consti-
tutional base on which it rests. Yet a similar provision has been
declared valid.2
-RALPH IM. WHITE.
GUARANTY - PROMISE OF BANKER "To INSURE" DEPOSIT -
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. - Plaintiff went to the Bank of F, fearing it
was insolvent, and intending to withdraw her deposit. Defendant,
a director, stockholder, and depositor in the Bank of F, who was
a man of means, known to plaintiff a long time, said to plaintiff,
"I will insure your money. It is safe here." The bank subse-
quently failed, and plaintiff sued defendant on his promise. Held,
defendant's promise was original, upon sufficient consideration,
10 Howard v. Citizens Bank and Trnst Co.. 12 ApT). D. C. 222 (1898) ; Mer-
rick v. Giddings, .mipra n. 15; Kimberly v. Butler. 14 Ped. Cas. 499 (1869);
Dovle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Mnn.. 151 Ark. 629, 2.18 S. IV. 40 (1922);
Phillips v. Browne, 270 fll. 450. 110 N. F. 601 (1915); Berlet v. Wcary, 67
Neb. 75, 93 N. W. 238 (1903 ; Wo-th v. Norton, 56 S. C. 56, 33 S. E. 792,
45 L. R. A. 563 (1898); Bartlett v. Blair, 68 N. H. 232, 38 Atl. 1004 (1894);
Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn. 542. 57 N. W. 212, 23 L. R. A. 632 (1893); Gen-
try v. Griffiths, 27 Tex. 461 (1864); Johnson v. Offutt, .mpra n. 6; Catlett v.
Morton, 4 Litt. 122 (Ky. 1823); see Wilder v. Welsh, 1 MacArthur 566 (D.
C. 1874).
17 McPherson v. Nesmith, 3 Gratt. 237 (Va. 1846).
1 8W. VA. CONST., art. V , § 17.
19 W. VA. REV. CoDn (1931) c. 4. art. 1, § 3.
20 Pittinger and Pugh, Ex'rs v. Marshll, 50 W. Va. 229, 40 S. E. 342
(1901).
21 See Phillips v. Browne, supra n. 16; noted in (1916) 16 COL. L. REV.
249. (The statute was held uncorsfitutional, however. ,s violating a provi-
sion against local or special legislation). What of the "guaranty" of speedy
justice in all cases? W. VA. CONST., art. M-I, § 17.
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